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I. INTRODUCTION
Carla wakes up in the morning, makes herself a cup of coffee, and
then boots up her computer to check her work email. Her boss re-
quires her to check her email before coming to work in order to get her
daily assignments. After checking her email, Carla maps out her
stops as an insurance adjuster; it takes her about twenty minutes to
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
Christine D. Higgins, B.A. 2005, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; J.D. expected
2008, University of Nebraska College of Law (NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW, Managing
Editor, 2007).
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do this. Carla then finishes getting ready for work and makes the
thirty minute commute to the central office where she is paid hourly.
When does Carla's workday begin? Should she be paid for commuting
time because she checked her email? Should she get paid for the time
it takes her to get ready? It might seem logical that Carla's workday
should not begin until she reaches the office, but this apparent answer
has been put into question after the United States Supreme Court de-
cision in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez. 1
In Alvarez, the Court expanded the compensable workday by hold-
ing that any preliminary activity which is "integral and indispensa-
ble" to the principal activity commences the compensable workday and
is not exempt under the Portal-to-Portal Act.2 The expansion of the
workday leads to the question of whether employers outside the con-
text of Alvarez must begin paying their employees for time spent com-
muting to and from work when an employee undertakes an "integral
and indispensable" preliminary activity outside the workplace, or per-
forms an "integral and indispensable" postliminary activity upon
reaching home. 3 In other words, in situations like the above example,
Carla's act of checking her email could potentially be considered an
activity which begins the workday, which means that all activities
conducted after that point are compensable. Such an extension seems
to undermine the Congressional purpose of the Portal-to-Portal Act
and could effectively re-create the excessively litigious climate be-
tween employer and employee that the Act was meant to contain. 4
Part II of this Note examines the history of the Portal-to-Portal Act
and discusses the contradictory holdings of the First and Ninth Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals which led to the Supreme Court's grant of certi-
orari on the issue. Part 1I will also address the Supreme Court's
opinion in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez. Part III explains the repercussions of
the Alvarez decision in areas outside of donning and doffing, focusing
on the issue of whether and when commuting time should be compen-
sable. In addition, Part III also considers the possibility of federal leg-
islation to clarify the area of commuting time under the Portal-to-
Portal Act. Finally, this section gives suggestions as to what employ-
ers should presently do in order to combat unwanted liability after
Alvarez.
1. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
2. Id. at 37; Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (2000). It could be argued
that Carla's act of checking her email was an "integral and indispensable" activ-
ity because she was required to do so in order to continue her work day.
3. See Neville F. Dastoor and Shane T. Mufioz, Labor and Employment Law: IBP v.
Alvarez, 80 FLA. B. J. 37, 40 (Feb. 2006).
4. For a complete discussion of the purpose and the background of the Portal-to-
Portal Act, see infra section II.A.
2007]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. History of the Portal-to-Portal Act
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA") implements stan-
dards for employment law issues such as minimum wage, overtime,
and employment of minors. 5 By putting these standards into practice,
the hope was to guarantee a certain quality of life for employees.6 The
primary purpose of the FLSA "was to aid the unprotected, unorgan-
ized and lowest paid of the nation's working population; that is, those
employees who lacked sufficient bargaining power to secure for them-
selves a minimum subsistence wage." 7 The FLSA holds employers lia-
ble for failing to meet the standards set out by the Act.8 The Portal-to-
Portal Act restricts the definition of what constitutes the compensable
work day, thereby limiting the liability of employers. 9 Indeed, Con-
gress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act in response to the Supreme
Court's 1946 decision in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. 10
In Anderson, the Supreme Court greatly expanded the compensa-
ble work day under the FLSA. In that case, employees at a pottery
plant brought an action against their employer for overtime compen-
sation for time spent walking to workstations after they clocked in,
putting on protective clothing, and preparing their machines for
work.11 The employees believed the method of computing compensa-
ble time "did not accurately reflect all the time actually worked and
that they were thereby deprived of proper overtime compensation
guaranteed them by [the FLSA]."12 The special master appointed by
the district court foun4 that the time in question did not require com-
pensation because the employees failed to show the time was spent
working. 13 The Court held that all of the activities in question were
compensable, stating; "Since the statutory workweek includes all time
during which an employee is necessarily required to be on the em-
ployer's premises, on duty or at a prescribed workplace, the time spent
in these activities must be accorded appropriate compensation."'14
The Court reasoned that this result occurred because the employees
were under the control of the employer during these times. 1 5 The em-
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2000).
6. Id. § 202 (2000).
7. Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neill, 324 U.S. 697, 707 n.18 (1945).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 215-16 (2006).
9. Id.
10. 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
11. Id. at 683.
12. Id. at 684.
13. Id. at 684-85.
14. Id. at 690-91.
15. Id. at 691.
[Vol. 86:208
CAN I GET PAID FOR THAT?
ployees' workday therefore included all activities that occurred after
they clocked into work.16
As a result of Anderson, thousands of employees flooded the courts
with litigation with claims in excess of $5,785,204,606 by January 31,
1947.17 At the time Congress addressed the issue, the largest settle-
ment by an employer was $4,656,000.18 As a response to the mount-
ing liability of employers, Congress began hearings to find a
solution. 19 Officials of the Navy, Army, and IRS testified that govern-
ment finances would be greatly affected by the numerous lawsuits.20
Following the hearings, Congress stated that Anderson had expanded
the FLSA too far, interfering with "long-established customs, prac-
tices, and contracts between employers and employees, thereby creat-
ing wholly unexpected liabilities, immense in amount and retroactive
in operation." 21 Congress' solution was the passage of the Portal-to-
Portal Act,2 2 which states in relevant part:
(a) Activities not compensable. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ... on account of the failure of such em-
ployer to pay an employee minimum wages, or to pay an employee overtime
compensation, for or on account of any of the following activities of such em-
ployee engaged in on or after May 14, 1947-
(1) walking, riding or traveling to and from the actual place of perform-
ance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is em-
ployed to perform, and
(2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal
activity or activities. 2 3
The purpose of the Portal-to-Portal Act was "to meet the existing
emergency and to correct existing evils (1) to relieve and protect inter-
state commerce from practices which burden and obstruct it; (2) to
protect the right of collective bargaining; and (3) to define and limit
16. Id. at 691-92.
17. See H.R. REP. No. 71 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.S. 1029, 1031. From July
1, 1946 (the Anderson decision was released in June) to January 31, 1947, there
were 1,913 federal cases filed seeking recovery of wages in light of the Anderson
interpretation of the FLSA. The dollar amount listed is the sum of 1,515 of these
cases which listed a specific amount sought for recovery. 398 cases did not list a
specific amount, so the dollar figure for federal cases would actually be somewhat
higher than $5,785,204,606 that was specifically pled. This figure also does not
include recoveries sought in similar state cases.
18. Id. at 1032. When taking inflation into account, the size of this award was excep-
tionally large.
19. Ray A. Brown, Vested Rights and the Portal-to-Portal Act, 46 MICH. L. REV. 723,
728 (1948).
20. Id.
21. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
22. Notes, Fair Labor Standards Under the Portal to Portal Act, 15 U. CHI. L. REV.
352, 352 (1948).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 254 (2000).
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the jurisdiction of the courts."24 The Act eliminated employer com-
pensational liability for employee activities discussed in Anderson
such as walking to work stations and preparing for principal activities
like donning necessary work gear.2 5
B. Steiner v. Mitchell
The Portal-to-Portal Act did not reach the Supreme Court for
nearly a decade after its passage. When it did, the Court created an
exception to the Portal-to-Portal Act in its 1956 decision, Steiner v.
Mitchell.26 Steiner dealt with battery plant employees who wore pro-
tective clothing and showered after work shifts to protect themselves
from exposure to toxic materials. 27 The showering and changing took
place at the worksite.28 Unless the employees underwent these pro-
tective measures, lead poisoning could occur from regular contact with
the toxic materials. If these precautions were not taken at the work-
site, the employees could pass the harmful effects of lead poisoning on
to their families. 29 The employees believed that they should be com-
pensated under the FLSA for these protective measures even though
they occurred preliminary and postliminary to their principal activi-
ties.30 They argued that since these activities were "integral and in-
dispensable" to their employment, the Portal-to-Portal Act should not
apply.3 1
The Court found for the employees and held that
activities performed either before or after the regular work shift, on or off the
production line, are compensable under the portal-to-portal provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act if those activities are an integral and indispensable
part of the principal activities for which covered workmen are employed and
are not specifically excluded by Section 4(a)(1). 3 2
The Court examined several factors surrounding the circumstances of
employment at the plant, including: "medical and industrial expert
testimony as to the effectiveness of plant ventilation, state statutory
and insurance requirements to provide clothes-changing and shower-
ing facilities, danger to employees' families from contact with work
clothes, and testimony that employees were required to take a shower
at the close of the workday." 33 It also reasoned that Congress had not
24. Id. § 251 (2000).
25. See James A. Matthews, Jr., Comment, Wage and Hours-Portal to Portal Act of
1947-Preliminary and Postliminary Activities, 2 VILL. L. REV. 246 (1957).
26. 350 U.S. 247 (1956).
27. Id. at 248.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 250.
30. Id. at 249.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 255 (1956) (emphasis added).
33. Id.
212 [Vol. 86:208
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meant to deprive employees of compensation in such instances where
the activity in question was "integral and indispensable."3 4 The Court
further substantiated its holding with legislative history of a discus-
sion between Senator Cooper and Senator McGrath, which stated that
in passing the Act, Congress did not mean to prevent recovery in such
situations where the activity was an integral part of the employee's
principal activity.3 5
The exception to the Act was narrowly construed by courts, which
limited the exceptions to situations where it was required due to "vital
considerations." 3 6 It was thought that the exception only applied to
situations where the health of the employees was at risk.37 Other
courts viewed the exception more broadly and applied it to circum-
stances where the employer required such activities before or after the
principal activity occurred.38 These conflicting views led to varying
judicial decisions and uncertainty as to the breadth of the Steiner
exception. 39
C. Court of Appeals' Decisions
The United States Supreme Court did not re-address the Steiner
exception for nearly fifty years. It finally tackled the issue after a cir-
cuit split occurred between the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez 40 and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
in Turn v. Barber Foods, Inc.4 1
1. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez
The Ninth Circuit addressed the Steiner exception in 2003 when
meat packing employees brought a suit against their employer for un-
paid wages under the FLSA in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez.4 2 At the plant,
employees disassembled animal carcasses and cut them into pieces in
preparation for sale.43 Due to the nature of this job, employers re-
34. Id.
35. Steiner, 350 U.S. 247 app. at 256-57.
36. Aguilar v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 560, 566 (Fed. Cl. 1996); but see Bobo v.
U.S., 37 Fed. Cl. 690 (1997).
37. See Aguilar, 36 Fed. Cl. at 566.
38. See, e.g., Dooley v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 307 F. Supp. 2d 234, 245 (D. Mass.
2004).
39. Compare Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. Inc, 750 F.2d 47, 50 (8th Cir.
1984) (stating that the Steiner exception should be read liberally when deciding
what activities are "integral and indispensable"), with Aguilar, 36 Fed. Cl. at 566
(stating that the exception should be read narrowly to only include situations of
vital health interests similar to those discussed in Steiner).
40. 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003), affd, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
41. 360 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2004), rev'd in part, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
42. Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 897.
43. Id. at 898.
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quired employees to don and doff protective gear before reporting to
the factory floor.44 However, the employer did not compensate em-
ployees for the following activities: time spent waiting to don protec-
tive clothing, donning protective clothing, walking from the changing
rooms to the factory floor, walking back to the changing rooms from
the factory floor to take off protective clothing, or time spent doffing
the clothing.45 The employees requested compensation for these
times, stating that the activities were "integral and indispensable."4 6
The Ninth Circuit held that "donning and doffing of job-related
protective gear" and waiting and walking were compensable because
the activities met the "integral and indispensable" exception set forth
in Steiner. 4 7 It came to this conclusion by first finding that the time in
question constituted "work" under the FLSA because the activities
were done under the control of and as required by the employer. 48 It
reasoned that the preliminary and postliminary activities were "nec-
essary to the principal work performed and done for the benefit of the
employer" and therefore required compensation.49 The court went on
to differentiate between unique and non-unique protective gear, stat-
ing that employees should not be compensated for donning and doffing
non-unique gear, such as "hardhats and safety goggles" because the
time it took to put on and take off such items was de minimis as a
matter of law.50
The Ninth Circuit effectively expanded the continuous workday
rule by holding that "the workday commenced with the performance of
a preliminary activity that was 'integral and indispensable' to the
work, and.., any activity occurring thereafter in the scope and course
of employment was compensable."51
44. Id. at 898 n.2. The employees were also required to prepare their slaughtering or
processing tools before reporting to the factory floor and "[alt the end of every
shift employees must clean, restore, and replace their tools and equipment." Id.
at 898.
45. Id. at 899-900.
46. Id. at 901.
47. Id. at 903-04.
48. Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 902.
49. Id. at 903.
50. Id. According to Black's Law Dictionary something is de minimus if it is "1. Tri-
fling; minimal. 2. (Of a fact or thing) so insignificant that a court may overlook it
in deciding an issue or case." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 464 (8th ed. 2004). The
United States Supreme Court did not make mention of the de minimis doctrine
within its opinion of IBP v. Alvarez. It also made no distinction between unique
and non-unique protective gear.
51. Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 906.
[Vol. 86:208214
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2. The First Circuit Court of Appeals: Turn v. Barber Foods,
Inc.
The First Circuit also addressed the Steiner exception in associa-
tion with donning and doffing in Turn v. Barber Foods, Inc. The em-
ployees in Turn worked at a chicken processing plant.5 2 The
employers paid the employees beginning when they clocked in at the
factory floor. Before reaching the floor, the employer required the em-
ployees to put on "lab coats, hairnets, earplugs, and safety glasses."53
The employees also had the option of wearing "gloves, aprons, and
sleeve covers."5 4 The employees sued for lost wages for the time spent
donning and doffing protective gear, the time spent walking from
changing areas to the factory floor, and the waiting time in relation-
ship to donning and doffing. 55
The First Circuit drew a different distinction between necessary
protective gear and unnecessary protective gear. It held that donning
and doffing of necessary protective gear was compensable, but the don-
ning and doffing of any non-required gear was not.5 6 It referred to the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning which stated that donning and doffing of re-
quired gear fell under the Steiner exception because it was an "inte-
gral and indispensable" activity and done for the "benefit of the
employer."5 7 It then held that compensating the employees for the
time it took to put on and take off non-required gear exceeded the
Steiner exception.58
The court proceeded to address whether the time spent walking to
and from the changing rooms to the factory floor was compensable.
The employees argued that walking time was compensable because it
occurred during the workday, which they believed started when the
first "integral and indispensable" activity occurred. 5 9 The court was
hesitant to adopt such an argument because it did not know how other
courts would interpret this holding. It stated such a holding could
cause the "absurd" result of employers having to pay employees from
the time they donned clothing at home to the time they reached the
52. 360 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2004), rev'd in part, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
53. Id. at 277.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 278.
56. Id. at 279-80. The First Circuit majority made no reference to the de minimis
doctrine. It might be questioned whether any of the employees' time spent don-
ning and doffing would have been compensable if this doctrine had applied since
the time spent donning and doffing "coats, hairnets, earplugs, and safety glasses"
would seem to be quite minimal. Id. at 277.
57. Id. at 279.
58. Turn v. Barber Foods, Inc., 360 F.3d 274, 280 (1st Cir. 2004), rev'd in part, 546
U.S. 21 (2005).
59. Id.
2007]
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plant.60 It reasoned that such a broad ruling would run contrary to
Congress's intent in passing the Portal-to-Portal Act and undermine
its purpose.61 It therefore held that time spent walking was not com-
pensable under the FLSA because it was explicitly excluded under the
Portal-to-Portal Act.62 Similarly, the court found that all waiting time
was non-compensable because "otherwise an almost endless number
of activities that precipitate the employees' essential tasks would be
compensable."63 In particular, it held that time waiting to punch the
time clock was not compensable because "[there [was] no indication
that any of the time spent waiting [was] controlled by the employer."64
D. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez
Although the First and Ninth Circuits agreed that time spent don-
ning and doffing protective gear was compensable, the discrepancies
in the Circuits' holdings led to the United States Supreme Court's
unanimous decision addressing the issues of walking and waiting time
in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez.65 The Court reached its conclusions by exam-
ining the primary issue of whether time spent walking to and from
dressing rooms to the work floor constituted compensable work time
under the FLSA, or whether the time was excluded under the Portal-
to-Portal Act. The Court also addressed the secondary issue of
whether time spent waiting to don and doff clothing was
compensable. 6 6
The Court began by describing the history of the Portal-to-Portal
Act, its effect on the workday, 67 and definitions of terms such as
"workday."68 The Court did not suggest a change to these defini-
60. Id. at 280-81. The reaction to the possibility of making walking time compensa-
ble led to the concern discussed in this note as to whether the logical next step
would be to make commuting time compensable. It is important to observe that
commuting time could only become compensable if an "integral and indispensa-
ble" preliminary or postliminary activity comes before or after the commute.
61. Id. Its purpose being to contain the litigious environment created after Anderson.
See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
62. Id. at 281.
63. Id. at 282.
64. Id. at 281-82.
65. 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
66. Id. at 24.
67. Id. at 26-29.
[T]o the extent that activities engaged in by an employee occur after the
employee commences to perform the first principal activity on a particu-
lar workday and before he ceases the performance of the last principal
activity on a particular workday, the provisions of [§4] have no
application.
Id. at 28. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(a) (2005).
68. "'[W]orkday' is generally defined as 'the period between the commencement and
completion on the same workday of an employee's principal activity or activi-
ties."' Id. at 29 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(b) (2005)).
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tions.69 Next addressed was the question of whether walking time w
as compensable. IBP argued that an intermediate category of activi-
ties should be formed for tasks, such as walking, which occurred after
a preliminary activity: the company believed that this time should not
be compensable.70 The Court refused to create an intermediate cate-
gory, stating that it was unlikely that Congress intended such a re-
sult.71 It also found that federal regulations on the topic did not
convincingly conclude that such time was not compensable. 72 It then
distinguished Alvarez from Anderson, pointing out that in Anderson
the walking time came before the principal activity, whereas in Alva-
rez the walking came after the principal activity of donning and dof-
fing.73 The Court stated that their opinion would not make time spent
walking from the time clock to where "principal activities" occurred
compensable. 7 4
For these reasons, the Court held that "any activity that is 'inte-
gral and indispensable' to a 'principal activity' is itself a 'principal ac-
tivity' under § 4(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act."7 5 It used Steiner as
the foundation of its reasoning, stating that the decision held not only
that "integral and indispensable activities" were compensable under
the FLSA, but also that they were "principal activities."76 It then
found that walking time was compensable under the continuous work-
day rule because it occurred after the first principal activity and
before the last.7 7 In reaching this conclusion, the Court upheld the
Ninth Circuit's opinion, while the First Circuit's opinion was affirmed
in part and reversed in part.78 The Court did not address what other
types of activities would now be considered compensable or whether
its holding was limited to factory decisions as illustrated in Alvarez.79
The Supreme Court partially overruled Turn by holding that time
waiting to doff was compensable because it occurred after the "princi-
pal activity," and therefore it was part of the workday under the con-
tinuous workday rule.8 0 However, it went on to state that the time
69. Id. at 28-9.
70. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 28-29 (2005).
71. Id. at 34.
72. Id. at 34-5 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(c) (2005)).
73. Id. at 35.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 37.
76. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 28-29 (2005) (citing Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S.
247, 253 (1956)).
77. Id. at 37. ("Moreover, during a continuous workday, any walking time that oc-
curs after the beginning of the employee's first principal activity and before the
end of the employee's last principal activity is excluded from the scope of [the
Portal-to-Portal Act], and as a result is covered by the FLSA.").
78. Id. at 42.
79. Id. at 34-35.
80. Id. at 34.
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the employees spent waiting to don was not compensable because it
constituted a "preliminary activity."8 ' The Court found "the fact that
certain preshift activities are necessary for employees to engage in
their principal activities does not mean that those preshift activities
are 'integral and indispensable' to a 'principal activity' under
Steiner."82 It reasoned that the employer in Tum did not require its
workers to be in the changing area to wait to don the protective gear,
and this activity was two-steps removed from the employee's activity
on the factory floor.83 In reaching its decision, the Court left some
issues unresolved which will require further consideration.8 4
III. ANALYSIS
Although the Supreme Court likely intended courts to interpret
IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez narrowly, ambiguities to the holding have
emerged-the most prominent of which deals with the extent of the
Court's holding.85 The holding states that "any activity that is 'inte-
gral and indispensable' to a 'principal activity' is itself a 'principal ac-
tivity' under § 4(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act."86 What the Supreme
Court meant by "any" is unclear other than it did not mean the hold-
ing to extend to situations discussed in Anderson.8 7 Also, the types of
preliminary and postliminary activities vital enough to the "principal
activity" to constitute "integral and indispensable" are difficult to de-
termine by examining the opinion.8 8
Due to these ambiguities, there is a strong possibility that Alva-
rez's holding will be interpreted broadly by the courts. This, in turn,
will extend it to situations outside of donning and doffing discussed in
Alvarez, which could circumvent the purpose of the Portal-to-Portal
Act.89
81. Id. at 40-41.
82. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 40-41 (2005).
83. Id. at 41-42.
84. The primary issue which will be discussed in this Note is what now qualifies as
part of the workday.
85. See Neville F. Dastoor and Shane T. Mufioz, Labor and Employment Law: IBP v.
Alvarez, 80 FLA. BAR. J. 37, 40 (Feb. 2006). This analysis will not address the
issue of Alvarez's impact on the de minimis defense. The Ninth Circuit's IBP
decision addressed the difference between unique and non-unique protective
gear, finding that time spent donning and doffing non-unique protective gear was
not compensable because the time it took to do so was de minimis. 339 F.3d 894,
904 (9th Cir. 2003). However, the Supreme Court did not address the issue of the
difference between unique and non-unique protective gear and did not make ref-
erence to the de minimis defense in Alvarez.
86. See supra note 75.
87. See supra note 73.
88. This Note will not directly address this issue.
89. Supreme Court Donning, Doffing Decision Raises Timekeeping Questions, Attor-
neys Say, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 154, at B-2 (Aug. 10, 2006).
[Vol. 86:208218
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A. Warnings
Courts might interpret the Supreme Court's decision in Alvarez to
mean that any preliminary activity begins the workday. Such an in-
terpretation could lead to the conclusion that travel time after such an
activity is compensable. It appears that the First Circuit decided not
to find walking time compensable largely because they were afraid
that such a holding would lead to compensability of activities that
were clearly restricted under the Portal-to-Portal Act.
In his concurring opinion in Turn, Chief Judge Boudin expressed
this very concern.9 0 By looking to the history of the Portal-to-Portal
Act, he concluded that making this time compensable went against
the Act's objective of making such time non-compensable and would
re-create the litigious environment that followed Anderson.9 1 Boudin
feared that such a holding would lead to employers paying for com-
muting time in situations such as traveling to a mine site, which was
historically not compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act.92
IBP addressed Judge Boudin's hesitation in finding waiting and
walking time compensable within its appellate brief.93 IBP stated
that finding such time compensable would increase employer liability
which would conflict with the purpose behind the Portal-to-Portal
Act-to decrease employer liability.9 4 IBP also argued that the Con-
gressmen and Senators who passed the Act intended compensation
only for such activities which employees were employed to perform. 9 5
IBP reasoned that allowing compensation for waiting and walking
time would force the conclusion that the employees were employed for
these services. 96
During oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts seemed to imply that
finding such time compensable would impact precedent in other areas
when he referred to the "canine cases" where police officers wished to
be compensated for time spent outside of their workday where they
fed, walked, and groomed police dogs.9 7 This line of cases found that
the time was compensable, but that such time did not make the com-
muting time to work compensable. 98
90. Turn v. Barber Foods, Inc., 360 F.3d 274, 283 (1st Cir. 2004) (Boudin, J.,
concurring).
91. Id. at 285-86.
92. Id. at 284. More on this issue will be discussed infra at section III.B.
93. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 1, IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, No. 03-1238 (U.S. Sep. 6,
2005).
94. Id. at 18.
95. Id. at 12 (citing S. REP. No. 80-48, at 47 (1947)).
96. Id. at 18.
97. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) (Nos.
03-1238 & 04-66).
98. See Bull v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 212 (Fed. Cl. 2005). In this case, the court
found time compensable for time Customs and Border Protection Service Agents
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If courts broadly interpret Alvarez, it will increase employer liabil-
ity because an employer will need to compensate an employee for time
previously excluded under the Act.9 9 The Court clearly believed that
Alvarez's result was a logical application of the Steiner exception0oo
The question now exists whether the Supreme Court meant commut-
ing time to be compensable under this precedent.
B. Commuting Time as Part of the Workday
The court system has already felt the consequences of the Alvarez
decision. Employees are applying the standard to issues outside the
realm of donning and doffing and even to the service sector. Employ-
ees are asking to be compensated "for the time it takes to boot up a
computer and read materials, or to put on sterile gear for work with
medicines." 0 1 The decision has also created ambiguity in the area of
commuting time. Before Alvarez, some courts found commuting time
to be compensable in situations where an "integral and indispensable
activity" occurred before the commute. 10 2 Cases decided after Alvarez
have found that time spent commuting is not compensable under the
continuous workday rule, even though it appears that the commute is
a necessary part of the employment and conducted under the power of
the employer. 103 It is clear from looking at the purpose and language
of the Portal-to-Portal Act that commuting time should not be compen-
sable except in the rare occasion where the employee conducts his
commute after reporting to a central location and where the actual
commute is an "integral and indispensable activity."104
cleaned canine towels outside of work. Chief Justice Roberts' concern was likely
how situations like this correspond to the continuous workday rule. It could be
interpreted that since the employer valued this activity enough to require com-
pensation that it started the workday. However, it seems like that such an ex-
pansive interpretation greatly exceeds Alvarez.
99. See Jerry C. Newsome and K. Alex Khoury, Labor and Employment, 57 MERCER
L. REV. 1159, 1161 (2006) (stating "[tihe Supreme Court's emphasis on the 'con-
tinuous workday' method of computing a worker's compensable time will require
employers to pay their employees for more of their nonproductive time while at
work." Id.).
100. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005).
101. Correy E. Stephenson, Employees Increasingly File Suits Alleging Violations of
Fair Labor Standards Act and State Laws, MISSOURI LAWYERS WEEKLY, July 24,
2006, at 18.
102. See Dooley v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 307 F. Supp. 2d 234, 239 (D. Mass. 2004)
(holding that commuting time was compensable because an "integral and indis-
pensable activity" occurred before the commute).
103. Smith v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 462 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2006).
104. See supra notes 23 and 24. The language of the Portal-to-Portal Act states that
employers are not required to compensate their employees for time traveling to
the actual place of performance. Also, the Act explains that "preliminary" and
"postliminary" activities are not compensable. Commuting seems to be within
this category.
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In light of Alvarez, one should examine the potential outcome of
compensability of commuting time. Courts could likely come to oppo-
site conclusions by attempting to apply the standard in Alvarez. An
illustration of this exists in the following hypothetical:
Carla, a damage appraiser is compensated by her employer for activities such
as checking her email, responding to messages, and planning a route for her
daily appraisals. 1 0 5 After Carla completes these activities, she commutes to
her first job. After finishing her last appraisal, Carla also receives payment
for activities completed at home like "checking email and voice mail, making
phone calls, completing estimates, and downloading and reviewing [her] as-
signments for the next day."1 0 6 During her job, Carla drives her own vehicle
and pays for her own gas. Should the employer pay Carla for the time she
commutes to her first adjustment and for the commuting time home after the
last adjustment?
Utilizing the analysis in Alvarez, it seems that this time would be
compensable under the new expansion of the workday. The prelimi-
nary activities appear "integral and indispensable" to the job which
would begin the workday under the continuous workday rule. The ac-
tivities are necessary because if Carla did not perform them she could
not proceed with her assignments for the day. The activities also take
more than a couple of minutes to complete which means they would
likely not be considered de minimis. Furthermore, it appears that the
employer views the activities as important because he values them
enough to compensate Carla for them.
However, even though it seems that the situation meets the ele-
ments of the Alvarez test, it is not certain whether the new extension
of the workday would apply. The time might not be compensable
under some of Alvarez's reasoning. For instance, Alvarez stated that
just because a preshift activity is necessary does not mean that it fits
under the "integral and indispensable" exception to the Portal-to-Por-
tal Act.107 The fact that the application of the test creates no level of
certainty and possible conflicting results suggests that the exception
should be better articulated in order for consistent application.
Application of the exception aside, it seems that compensating the
employees for the time it takes them to drive to the first appraisal
would overly extend the Supreme Court's holding. In the case of Alva-
rez, not only were the preliminary and postliminary activities "inte-
gral and indispensable to the workday," but they were also conducted
105. This hypothetical is strongly based on Dooley, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 239. This case
came out after the Ninth Circuit's ddcision and before the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Alvarez. The court in Dooley based its decision on the Ninth Circuit's rea-
soning in Alvarez, 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003). The court found that the
commuting time was compensable because "once the workday begins, workers'
time must be compensated under the FLSA until the end of the workday." Dooley
at 244.
106. Dooley, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 244.
107. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 40-41 (2005).
2007]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
on the same premises. Alvarez, Anderson, and Steiner are similar in
that all of activities were conducted within the same confines.O8 This
leads to the possible conclusion that in order for the exception to ap-
ply, the employees must find themselves in a location where all activi-
ties-principal, preliminary, and postliminary-occur in the same
place.
Also, the Court looked at the length of time it took to do the activi-
ties in question, and made a point of discussing the short duration of
the walking time:
[Flor processing division knife users, the largest segment of the work force at
IBP's plant, the walking time in dispute here consumes less time than the
donning and doffing activities that precede or follow it. It is more comparable
to time spent walking between two different positions on an assembly line
than to the prework walking in Anderson.1 0 9
In comparison, the insurance adjuster's commute might take as long
as a half an hour. This large amount of time is distinguishable from
the relatively short periods discussed in Alvarez. If a court found that
compensation of Carla's time was necessary, the holding would seem-
ingly exceed the Alvarez holding which dealt with short amounts of
time. In addition, this means that if Alvarez applied, the employer
would be forced to pay Carla an additional hour per day for time that
appears to be explicitly not compensable under the Portal-to-Portal
Act.110 Congress stated within the Act that an employer does not
have to compensate his employee for time spent "traveling to and from
the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities
which such employee is employed to perform."111
The above hypothetical also indicates one of the flaws in the Su-
preme Court's reasoning in Alvarez. IBP believed that the Court
needed to create three categories-compensable preliminary and
postliminary activities, unpaid intermediate activities such as walk-
ing time, and compensable principal activities. 1 12 In Alvarez, the Su-
preme Court held that the "integral and indispensable activity"
started the compensable workday primarily because it did not think
there were grounds to create a third category. 113 If the court in the
108. Alvarez was at a meat-packing plant. Steiner was at a battery manufacturing
plant. Anderson was at a pottery plant. The Supreme Court has not addressed
the Steiner exception in a setting outside of the industrial setting.
109. Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 35.
110. 29 U.S.C. § 254 (2000).
111. See supra note 23.
112. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-18, IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005)
(Nos. 03-1238 & 04-66).
113. As discussed supra note 71, the third category would be time that occurred after
the preliminary activity but before the principal activity. IBP's lawyer agreed
that the preliminary and postliminary activities were compensable under the
Steiner exception, but he argued that the Court should in effect create a third
category which would prevent compensability for activities that fell under the
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hypothetical found the time the employee spent driving to the first
appraisal site and the returning from the last appraisal site as not
compensable, it would fall in the intermediate category which the Su-
preme Court expressly declined to create.114
The possibility of having an intermediate category makes sense in
some instances, but not in others. As illustrated in Alvarez, it would
be impractical for the time clock to have stopped for the five minutes it
took to walk to the work station. However, when dealing with Carla's
commuting time, it does seem sensible to have an intermediate cate-
gory since the time in question is much more significant.
The above hypothetical further illustrates that the possibility ex-
ists for there to be at least five hours of commuting time a week.115
For example, assume Carla works forty hours a week before the addi-
tion of commuting time. Also, for purposes of this hypothetical, as-
sume Carla makes twenty dollars an hour. As discussed by the FLSA,
employers are required to pay their employees time and a half for any
time worked over forty hours per week.116 This means that every
week the employer pays Carla an additional fifty dollars for commut-
ing time, which equals $2,600 a year, or 6% of her annual income. 1 17
The liability to the employer would increase further if Carla and ten
other employees joined in an action against the employer for lost
wages. Assuming they each make a commute of at least a half hour
both ways, they could bring a collective action for $30,000 in unpaid
wages. 118 This would increase the liability of the employer and would
go against the commonly held notion that commuting time is not com-
pensable. 119 It is possible employees might abuse such holdings.120
This illustrates the necessity of having a third category of time that is
Portal-to-Portal Act which occurred after the "integral and indispensable activ-
ity." Reply Brief of Petitioner at 7-8, IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, No. 03-1238 (U.S. Sep.
6, 2005).
114. See supra note 112. This third category would conflict with the continuous work-
day rule because it would create a gap in the workday. The Supreme Court's
holding can be interpreted that once the workday has begun; it cannot be broken
up by an activity that would otherwise not be compensable under the Portal-to-
Portal Act.
115. This is not taking into consideration time delayed due to traffic accidents, getting
gas, etc.
116. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207 (2000).
117. This part of the hypothetical is based on a 52 week year. It does not take vacation
time into account.
118. This expansive type of litigation is exactly what the Portal-to-Portal Act sought to
avoid. In fact, the House Committee report on the issue used a markedly similar
hypothetical to prove the extent of employer liability. See H.R. REP. No. 71
(1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.S. 1029, 1031.
119. See Reich v. New York City Transit Auth., 45 F.3d 646 (2d Cir. 1995).
120. For example, the employee strikes a deal with the employer to do preliminary or
postliminary activities at home and brings an action for the commuting time fol-
lowing or preceding the activity.
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not compensable in order to prevent extended and unforeseen liability
to employers.
In addition, if courts found that the commuting time discussed in
the hypothetical was compensable, they would have missed one of the
foundational justifications the Supreme Court relied on to find that
the time in Alvarez was compensable. In affirming the Ninth Circuit's
opinion, the Court reasoned that walking time was compensable be-
cause the employees were under the control of the employer.121 Al-
though determining whether an employee is under the control of his
employer is a question of fact, it seems probable that the employee is
not under such control when he is driving his own vehicle, paying for
his own gas, and when an employee can frolic and detour. If we were
to change the hypothetical so that the employee drove a company vehi-
cle or had his mileage reimbursed by the employer, there would be a
far better argument that he would be under the control of the em-
ployer during his commute.
The above hypothetical gives an example of a situation where
courts could find commuting compensable by interpreting Alvarez. If
this becomes the norm, a logical extension could be that all commut-
ing time is now compensable. Such an understanding would fully con-
firm the fear that Chief Judge Boudin noted.122 The possibility still
remains that the Supreme Court meant for Alvarez to be interpreted
broadly, requiring compensation in these situations. Although this
expansive interpretation seems unlikely, if this is the case, the Su-
preme Court used Alvarez to effectively repeal the specified sections of
the Portal-to-Portal Act and took employers back to a litigious post-
Anderson environment.
Even though the hypothetical makes it appear that no commuting
time should be compensable, limited situations exist where such com-
pensation might be appropriate under the Steiner exception. Burton
v. Hillsborough County, Fla.12 3 illustrates one such situation. That
case addressed county employees' driving time. The county employees
drove throughout the county inspecting work sites. They drove county
vehicles which they were required to pick up every morning before
they went to their first inspection. The vehicles contained tools neces-
sary for the inspectors' jobs and also served as "satellite office[s]."124
The county did not start paying the employees until they arrived at
the first worksite. The employees brought an action against the
121. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005). See also Smith v. Aztec Well Servicing
Co., 462 F.3d 1274, 1288 (10th Cir. 2006). The court found that the commuting
time in question is not compensatory because the employees are not under control
of the employer.
122. Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc., 360 F.3d 274, 284 (Boudin, J. concurring).
123. 181 Fed.App'x 829 (11th Cir. 2006).
124. Id. at 831.
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county for overtime compensation for the time they spent driving in
county vehicles. The county argued that commuting time was not
compensable under the Portal-to-Portal exception of FLSA.125
The court held that the commuting time was compensable. 126 In
its reasoning, the court pointed to a federal regulation which stated
that the time in question should be compensated. 12 7 It also differenti-
ated between this type of commute and "home-to-work and work-to-
home travel," stating that the latter was not compensable in accor-
dance with the regulation because .' [n] ormal travel from home to work
[whether at a fixed location or at different job sites] is not worktime'
because it is 'an incident of employment,' and is therefore not compen-
sable."128 It reasoned that the purpose of the employees going to a
central location to pick up vehicles was for the convenience of the em-
ployer. By leaving cars at that location, the risk of vandalism lessened
and the employers also avoided expenses "associated with potential
abuse of the vehicles for personal or unofficial use."12 9
Going to the central location to get the vehicle closely resembles
the activities of donning and doffing, and therefore, it makes sense
that this activity would be treated as an "integral and indispensable"
activity within the workday under Alvarez.130 In addition, the actual
commute in this case could be considered an "integral and indispensa-
ble activity" since the employee had to drive the county vehicle in or-
125. Burton is different from the hypothetical because in Burton: 1) The employees
had to report to a central location before they started their commute and 2) The
employer owned the vehicle and paid for all expenses associated with the vehicle.
In Burton, the employees had to undergo two commutes-the commute from
their home to the central location, and from the central location to the first job
site. Id.
126. Id. at 838.
127. 29 C.F.R. § 785.38 (1961):
When an employee is required to report at a meeting place to receive
instructions or to perform other work there, or to pick up and to carry
tools, the travel from the designated place to the work place is part of the
day's work, and must be counted as hours worked regardless of contract,
custom or practice. If an employee normally finishes his work on the
premises at 5 p.m. and is sent to another job which he finishes at 8 p.m.
and is required to return to his employer's premises arriving at 9 p.m.,
all of the time is working time. However, if the employee goes home in-
stead of returning to his employer's premises, the travel after 8 p.m. is
home-to-work travel and is not hours worked.
128. Burton, 181 Fed.App'x at 834 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 785.35).
129. Id. at 837.
130. Id. (Note that coming to such a holding does not take into consideration the pos-
sibility that the Steiner exception was only meant to be applied in factory set-
tings. If Steiner only applies in those instances, this case would likely fall under
the Portal-to-Portal Act; therefore, the time in question would not be compensa-
ble even though it appears to be an "integral and indispensable" activity.)
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der to have the necessary tools for the job, and the vehicle served as an
office for the employee.131
Burton differs from the above hypothetical in that a federal regula-
tion exists that states such time should be compensable, whereas the
same federal regulation states that "home-to-work and work-to-home
travel" should not be compensable.132 Even though the employee in
the above hypothetical conducts preliminary activities at home, the
employee's commute time is still the type of work time considered not
compensable under the federal regulation. The existence of the fed-
eral regulation illustrates a situation where a direct application of Al-
varez would violate long standing principles and regulations.
Furthermore, the preliminary work is not done so much for the conve-
nience of the employer, but for the employee. It also appears that the
amount of control the employer has over the employee in the hypothet-
ical is markedly different from the control illustrated in Burton. 133
Solutions need to be established to deal with the above situations
which would lead to consistency and acceptance of precedent. Em-
ployees should not have to question what parts of their workday
should and should not be compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act.
C. Solutions
Possible solutions based on judicial and legislative action exist to
deal with many of the above situations.
1. Judicial Interpretation
The Supreme Court should better articulate what constitutes "in-
tegral and indispensable activities" and address the issue of when
commuting time would be compensable. It is unclear whether the
Court meant the holding in Alvarez to only apply to cases where the
employee remained on the premises for the duration of all activi-
131. Id. at 837-38.
132. It should also be recognized that home-to-work and work-to-home travel has long
been held to be not compensable due to the Portal-to-Portal Act. In a 1957 law
review article, it was stated that "[t]he language of this section and the legislative
history of the act indicate that the walking, riding or traveling time referred to in
this section is that which takes place in the course of the employee's trips be-
tween his home and the actual place where he works." James A Matthews, Jr.,
Wage and Hours-Portal to Portal Act of 1947-Preliminary and Postliminary
Activities, 2 VILL. L. REV. 246, 249 (1957).
133. But see Sec'y of Labor v. E.R. Field, Inc., 495 F.2d 749, 751 (1st Cir. 1974). In
that case, the employer required the electrician to report to the employer's shop
before traveling to the first worksite. That case illustrates that if, in the above
hypothetical, the employer had required the adjuster to report to a central loca-
tion before going to his first jobsite that his commute time would more likely be
compensable.
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ties.1 3 4 The best solution would be to have the Court address a case
where compensation for commuting time is the primary issue. A good
candidate for the Court would be a case that examines the commuting
time of mine workers.13 5
However, this solution seems unlikely and would take many years
and an onslaught of litigation before it reached the Justices' attention.
By this time, the litigious environment between employer and em-
ployee may have reached the extreme situation that forced the pas-
sage of the Portal-to-Portal Act. As a result, Congressional legislation
is a more suitable solution.
2. Legislative Action
The best solution appears to be Congressional legislation. If Con-
gress believes that commuting time should be included within the Por-
tal-to-Portal Act, it should articulate that belief within the Act.
However, it seems unlikely that Congress would choose to amend the
Act in this direction given the legislative history of it, the regulations
that discuss the Act, and case law which has predominately held that
commuting time is not compensable.13 6 In addition, doing so would
likely increase liability.137
Instead, Congress should amend the Portal-to-Portal Act to include
a section discussing commuting time which operates in accordance
with the long-standing precedents and regulations. The amendment
could state:
Home-to-work and work-to-home travel shall not be compensable even if a
preliminary or postliminary activity occurs at the employee's home. In order
for commuting time to be compensable, the employee must first report to a
central location of the employer, and the commute must be conducted under
substantial control of the employer. An employer may compensate an em-
ployee for preliminary and postliminary activities conducted at home, but
these activities do not effectively begin or end the workday under the continu-
ous workday rule.
This clear expression of how commuting time should be treated
would lead to predictable outcomes. The commuting time in the hypo-
thetical would not be compensable because the employee has not re-
ported to a central workplace before going to her first job of the day. It
134. See supra section II.D.
135. Compare Smith v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 462 F.3d 1274, 1287-90 (10th Cir.
2006) (In Smith, the employees traveled an hour to mines every morning with
their work group. Although the employer did not make the commute with the
work group mandatory, the route to the mines was such that unless the employee
had an SUJV, the roads were impassable. The court found that the commute time
did not qualify as an "integral and indispensable activity."), with Burton v. Hills-
borough County, Fla., 181 Fed.App'x 829 (11th Cir. 2006) discussed supra. Are
the two cases really that different?
136. See supra sections II.A & III.B.
137. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 254 (2000).
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seems most likely that the employee is not under substantial control
of the employer during her commute, but this remains a question of
fact for the fact-finder. Under this proposed amendment to the Act, an
employee would still receive compensation for the time he spent doing
preliminary and postliminary activities necessary to his job.
This proposed amendment would also make it clear that commut-
ing time is compensable in situations like Burton. The employee re-
ported to a central location by showing up at the lot to pick up the
county vehicle. The commute is likely under the substantial control of
the employer since the employee is driving a county vehicle which op-
erates as his satellite office. These two examples show how amending
the statute would solve the existing problem and create predictable
solutions in the area of commuting under the Portal-to-Portal Act.
3. Employer Solutions Today
Presently, employers should take great precautions to avoid the
possibility of litigation after Alvarez. They need to re-examine their
payment practices to assure that they pay employees for intervals of
time spent after an "integral and indispensable activity" has been con-
ducted. 138 As stated throughout this Note, what constitutes an "inte-
gral and indispensable activity" which effectively begins the workday
is unclear, so employers should err on the side of caution. It is clear
that activities similar to donning and doffing start the compensable
workday. Employers should ask themselves whether the activity ap-
pears more like a donning and doffing or more like the clocking-in dis-
cussed in Anderson. 139
If an employer finds that such period of time exists where it should
be compensating employees, it should re-examine the situation and
determine if an alternative exists which would shorten this time.140
In a situation like the hypothetical discussed above, the employer
could have a home base located in a central location of the adjustment
area. The employer could then require the adjusters to report to that
location to check their email, plan their routes, and check their
messages. If having the employees report to a central location is not
an option, the employers should not compensate their employees for
time spent performing preliminary and postliminary activities. As
discussed above, compensating employees for this time makes it more
likely that the courts would view the activity as "integral and
indispensable."
138. See Neville F. Dastoor and Shane T. Mufioz, Labor and Employment Law: IBP v.
Alvarez, 80 FLA. B. J. 37, 40 (Feb. 2006).
139. This seems like a difficult distinction to make. However, it appears that the
Court found that such a distinction was possible to establish. See IBP, Inc. v.
Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 35 (2005).
140. For example, the employer could place the locker rooms closer to the plant floor.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Carla boots up her computer, gets her work assignments, and
plans her map for the day. She then jumps into her car and turns on
the radio news channel, catching up on the day's current events. As
news clips of war, kidnapping, and environmental destruction flash
across the airwaves, Carla thinks about issues closer to home. Most
importantly she asks herself, "Can I get paid for this?"
While Congress might not be able to create world peace, stop
crime, or save the world from global warming, it could easily answer
Carla's question. Legislative action would be the best alternative to
curb the possibility of a mountain of litigation that will likely ensue in
the wake of IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez. Although most workers want to get
paid for the commute to and from work, such a result would put sub-
stantial liability on the employer and would create the possibility of
employee abuse. If action does not occur, courts could find that when
Carla boots up her computer to check her work email her workday has
begun.
